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Pluralism in British Islamic Reasoning: The Problem with Recognizing
Islamic Law in the United Kingdom. By Sameer Ahmed
Difference amongst my community is a sign of the bounty ofAllah.
-Saying of the Prophet Muhammad
I. Introduction
In February 2008, Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams, the
leader of the Church of England, gave a lecture in London arguing that legal
recognition of shari'a law in Britain "seems unavoidable."' Then, "all hell
broke loose.", 2 Trevor Phillips, the chairman of the Equality and Human
Rights Commission responded, "Raising this idea in this way will give fuel to
anti-Muslim extremism and dismay everyone working towards a more
integrated society." 3 Others had more visceral reactions. Stephen Green, the
director of Christian Voice, said, "This is a Christian country with Christian
laws. If Muslims want to live under sharia law then they are free to emigrate
to a country where sharia law is already in operation.",4 Columnist Yasmin
Alibhai-Brown, a "modem Muslim woman," added, "What Rowan Williams
wishes upon us is an abomination."
5
Williams's remarks were the latest in a debate among the British
political elite and media on how best to accommodate the religious practices
of the two million Muslims residing in the United Kingdom. Those who share
Williams's view contend that adopting parts of Islamic family law would help
maintain social cohesion in the United Kingdom, even if the Islamic practices
were contrary to more liberal British norms. On the other hand, the vast
majority who oppose Williams argue, often in a knee-jerk fashion, that
Islamic law as a whole is intolerant, oppressive, and misogynistic, and
therefore has no place in the United Kingdom. This Recent Development will
address two significant issues that are conspicuously absent from the British
debate: First, what aspects of Islamic family law do British Muslims want to
implement in the United Kingdom? Second, how do British Islamic scholars
believe these family law issues should be implemented in the United
Kingdom? Only after considering these questions can one develop a
principled approach to accommodating British Muslims, an approach that will
do justice to the diversity of both Islamic legal thought and the British Muslim
1. Shari'a Law in UK Is "Unavoidable," BBC NEWS, Feb 7, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/7232661 .stm.
2. Noah Feldman, Why Shariah?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM (Magazine), at 46.
3. Jonathan Petre & Andrew Porter, "Adopt Sharia Law in Britain, " Archbishop's Call
Provokes Political and Religious Backlash, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 8, 2008, at 1.
4. Id. Christian Voice is a private British religious organization aiming "to uphold
Christianity as the Faith of the United Kingdom." Christian Voice, About Us,
http://www.christianvoice.org.uk/about4.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2008).
5. Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, What He Wishes on Us Is an Abomination, INDEPENDENT
(London), Feb. 9, 2008, at 4.
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community. Precisely because of these diversities, the United Kingdom
should be wary of legally recognizing aspects of Islamic family law. If the
British government enshrines one interpretation of Islamic family law into its
legal apparatus, it will confer authority over that interpretation while
excluding others, undermining the pluralism inherent in Islamic jurisprudence.
II. British Muslims' Practice of Islamic Family Law
Before analyzing the applicability of Islamic law in the United
Kingdom, one must first understand what is meant by the term "Islamic law."
Islamic law usually refers to the entire collection of fiqh (Islamic legal
rulings). While some writers use Islamic law interchangeably with the shari 'a,
the two can have significantly different meanings. The British Muslim
scholars referred to in this Recent Development use the term shari'a in
different ways. While some view shari'a in its most legalistic sense (almost
synonymous tofiqh or Islamic law), others consider shari'a in a more general
sense-as a way of life a Muslim must follow to reach "the Source" (God).
Those British Muslims who support legal recognition of Islamic law are
almost universally referring only to Islamic family law-thefiqh pertaining to
marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, and other family-related issues. 6
The reasons for preserving aspects of Islamic family law in the United
Kingdom have both historical and practical significance. Left relatively
untouched by colonial rulers in the late nineteenth century, family law remains
one of the only areas of law in many Muslim-majority countries still based on
centuries of Islamic jurisprudence. While many of the twentieth-century
postcolonial Muslim states adopted European criminal and commercial laws,
most developed their own family law codes inspired by Islamic legal rulings.
7
Thus British Muslims, many of whom immigrated to the United Kingdom
since the 1960s, have attempted to adapt their Islamic family law traditions to
their new surroundings, and have encountered difficulties when religious
customs conflict with state law.
One problem British Muslims have encountered is the issue of "limping"
marriages, which are considered valid by one legal system, but dissolved by
another.8 Because some Islamic scholars believe a British civil divorce is not
religiously valid, many British Muslims divorce twice-civilly and
Islamically. 9 However, a problem exists when a Muslim man divorces his
wife in a civil proceeding, but not according to Islamically accepted
procedures.10 Since the couple would still be considered married under some
6. Recent data gives mixed views as to whether British Muslims would prefer official
recognition of Islamic family law. On the one hand, a report on British Muslims published in 2002
claims that the majonty of Muslims would oppose the idea. See HUMAYUN ANSARI, MUSLIMS IN
BRITAIN 23 (2002). On the other hand, a 2004 Guardian/ICM poll found that sixty-one percent of
British Muslims want Islamic law courts in civil cases "so long as the penalties did not contravene
British law." Alan Travis & Madeleine Bunting, British Muslims Want Islamic Law and Prayers at
Work, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 30, 2004, at 1.
7. See SAMI ZUBAIDA, LAW AND POWER IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 158 (2003).
8. See IHSAN YILMAZ, MUSLIM LAWS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN MODERN NATION STATES:
DYNAMIC LEGAL PLURALISMS IN ENGLAND, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN 150 (2005).
9. See id. at 80.
10. Traditionally, under Islamic law, there are three ways to dissolve a marriage. First, talaq is
where a man unilaterally and extrajudicially divorces his wife without showing cause, and in return, the
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interpretations of Islamic law, they would be in a limping marriage. Since
polygyny has historically been allowed in Islamic law, under these
circumstances the husband is still able to remarry both civilly and Islamically.
In contrast, the wife is held hostage, unable to remarry because, in the eyes of
many in the Muslim community, she is still married. Furthermore, she has no
recourse to British state law because the couple is legally divorced. Some
Muslim men have, therefore, been able to blackmail their wives by
withholding an Islamic divorce unless their wives agree to favorable
settlements on financial compensation, property, and child custody."
Since the U.K. legal system has very few remedies to adequately resolve
the limping marriages problem, British Muslims have developed their own
formal dispute settlement processes: shari'a councils. These have been
established by British Muslim leaders who have recognized the need to create
an unofficial Islamic family law system that would allow Muslim women to
divorce their husbands "Islamically" without the risk of being blackmailed.
The primary function of shari'a councils is to act as qadis (Islamic judges) and
issue "Islamic divorces" to Muslim women trapped in limping marriages,
allowing them to leave their former husbands without fearing religious12
consequences.
Il. The British Islamic Scholars' Debate over Legal Recognition of
Islamic Family Law
British Islamic scholars differ over whether shari'a councils, which are
currently not recognized by the British legal system, are the best way of
resolving Muslims' marital disputes and implementing Islamic family law in
the United Kingdom. For the most part, they have taken one of three positions
on the issue: (1) the United Kingdom needs a legally enforceable Islamic
family law system; (2) unofficial shari'a councils are adequate to meet the
needs of British Muslims; or (3) shari'a councils are unnecessary, because
Muslims can solely follow British law and still adhere to the principles of the
shari 'a. The next three Sections elaborate on each of these stances.
This diversity of viewpoints among Muslim scholars is the latest
illustration of the long-standing Islamic legal doctrine of ikhtilaaf, the
recognition of the validity of different interpretations of usul al-fiqh, or
Islamic legal reasoning. Since the first centuries of Islam, Muslim jurists
discerned that while revealed texts such as the Qur'an are infallible, human
interpretation of these texts remains fallible. Although scholars can and do
debate the strengths and weaknesses of different methods of interpretation, in
wife is able to keep her full mahr (dower). Second, khula is where a woman extrajudicially divorces her
husband and grants him financial compensation, usually the return of her mahr, in exchange for the
divorce. Third, afaskh (annulment) or tafrtq is where a woman can petition a qadi, an Islamic judge, for
a divorce on various grounds, such as physical and emotional abuse, desertion, sexual impotency, and
failure to financially support her. See DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 280-86
(1998).
11. LucY CARROLL, MUSLIM WOMEN AND "ISLAMIC DIVORCE" IN ENGLAND 5-6 (1998),
available at http://www.wluml.org/english/pubsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B87%5D=i-87-2684.
12. Dozens of shari'a councils exist throughout the United Kingdom. See, e.g., The Islamic
Shari'a Council, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2008); The Muslim Law (Shariah)
Council, http://www.muslimcollege.ac.uk/index.aspid= 170&type=detail (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
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theory they cannot deny each other the right to reach different legal rulings.' 3
In order to maintain this pluralism inherent in Islamic law, the British
government should be wary of privileging any one of the three positions over
another.
A. Legal Recognition Needed
Scholars who believe British Muslims require a legally enforceable
system of Islamic family law argue that the shari 'a consists of a specific set of
rules distinct from British state laws. 14 They contend that the best way of
resolving the conflicts between Islamic and British family laws is to legally
recognize Islamic family law in the United Kingdom. These scholars have
suggested two main ways of incorporating Islamic law into the British legal
system: (1) to create a legally enforceable Islamic faith-based family law
arbitration system, or (2) to allow British judges to apply Islamic family law
for Muslim litigants.
Some British Muslim leaders have proposed establishing an arbitration
council to settle family law disputes using Islamic principles that would issue
awards which could be enforced by the British courts.' 5 However, Parliament
would need to amend the 1996 Arbitration Act to make this type of religious
arbitration enforceable.' 6 Currently, the Act does not allow Islamic arbitrators
to displace the jurisdiction of British courts to decide child custody issues or
to issue "Islamic divorces." 17 Other scholars have suggested the British
government make decisions issued by shari'a councils legally enforceable.
One proposed that Parliament create a registration system for shari'a councils
in order to maintain high standards and procedural safeguards. Once
registered, shari'a council decisions would be legally binding.'8
Another model of legally recognizing Islamic family law supported by
some scholars is to have British judges adjudicate matters using Islamic
family law for Muslim litigants. They suggest adopting the Indian approach,
where recognized religious communities-Muslims, Christians, Zoroastrians,
Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs-are governed by their own family laws
as applied by the state court system.19 One scholar has even drafted a 162-
clause Islamic family law code-based on a book by famed Syrian scholar
13. See YILMAZ, supra note 8, at 31-35.
14. For example, one scholar stated, "Islam gives us a set of rules in all aspects of life,
including family law. Islam has its own rules on marriage, divorce, child custody, etc. The British legal
system also has its own set of rules. If you are a practicing Muslim, you have to obey Islam's set of
rules." Interview with the Leader of an Institute of Islamic Jurisprudence, in Leicester, Eng. (May 9,
2006) (name and affiliation withheld).
15. See ISLAMIC SHARI'A COUNCIL, ARBITRATION FIRST: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR ON
SUNDAY 1 ITH SEPTEMBER 2005 (2005). This type of religious arbitration had been in place in Ontario,
Canada from 1992 until February 2006. See MARION BOYD, OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION 9-11 (2004).
16. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23 (Eng.).
17. See id
18. AHMAD THOMPSON, INCORPORATING MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW INTO UK DOMESTIC LAW 2-
3 (2004), http://www.aml.org.uk/resources/AMSS AT Notes 22 02 04.pdf.
19. Archana Parashar, The Concept of Relgious Personal Laws, in TOWARDS LEGAL
LITERACY: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW IN INDIA 147, 147 (Kamala Sankaran & Ujjwal Kumar Singh eds.,
2008).
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Mustafa Al-Suba'i-that the British courts could follow when adjudicating
family law issues for Muslims.
20
B. Unofficial Shari 'a Councils Are Adequate
British Islamic scholars who contend that unofficial shari'a councils are
adequate to meet the needs of Muslims also view the shari'a as a set of rules
that may conflict with British state law. However, these scholars further insist
that Muslims have a religious obligation to obey the laws of their resident
countries, unless they are forced by law to commit a sin.2 1 Moreover, they
stress that following the shari'a is voluntary, and for the most part, Islamic
law does not need to be enforced by the state.22 For these reasons, they argue
that Muslims should find ways of solving conflicts between British state law
and the shari'a without demanding a separate system of Islamic family law.
For example, they support measures like the Divorce (Religious Marriages)
Act of 2002, which attempts to solve the problem of limping marriages by
allowing a court to require the dissolution of a religious marriage before
granting a civil divorce. 23 In theory, the Act could grant British judges
discretion to require that a Muslim couple have an "Islamic divorce" at a
shari'a council before issuing them a civil divorce.
24
C. Shari'a Councils Are Unnecessary
Finally, British Islamic scholars who argue that shari'a councils are
unnecessary view the shari'a in a less legalistic way than their counterparts
described above. Believing the shari'a should reflect its literal definition as a
"path to the source," they contend that British Muslims should rethink Islamic
practices in terms of the broader principles of the Qur'an and the shari 'a, an
approach referred to in Islamic legal theory as the maqasid al-shari'a (the
objectives of the shari'a).25 Thus, they argue that if British state law espouses
the main objectives of the shari'a-upholding mercy, justice, and educating
the individual-Muslims do not need to follow a separate Islamic family law
26largely inherited from abroad. Using this reasoning, they contend that in
most areas of family law, Muslims only need to follow British civil law. For
20. See Mustafa al-Sibai, Muslim Personal Law (Marriage & Divorce), in MUSLIM PERSONAL
LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR 5, 5-28 (Khola Hasan, ed., Suhaib Hasan, trans., Islamic Shari'a
Council 2004).
21. Hadith (sayings) of the Prophet Muhammad support this argument: "[O]beying [a ruler] is
a duty as long one is not commanded to rebellion (against Allah) .... " SUNNIPATH, Book of Jhad and
Military Expeditions, THE SAHIH COLLECTION OF AL-BUKHARI (Aisha Bewley trans.),
http://www.sunnipath.com/Library/Hadith/H0002P0061.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
22. Interview with Sec'y, a Shari'a Council, in London, Eng. (Mar. 7, 2006) ("[O]bedience to
shari'a law is a voluntary choice. If the parties do not accept our decision, and decide to break sharl'a
law, they will be accountable in the eyes of God.") (name and specific affiliation withheld).
23. Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act, 2002, c. 27 (Eng.).
24. Although the Act was established primarily to resolve Jewish limping marriages (the Act
specifically states that it is responding to "Judaism and other religions"), in theory, it could also apply to
Muslims. See id.
25. Mohammed Hashim Kamali, Al-Maqasid Al-Shari 'ah: The Objectives of Islamic Law, 3
THE MUSLIM LAWYER 1, 1-7 (1998), available at http://www.aml.org.uk/joumal/3.1/Kamali%20-
%20Maqasid.pdf.
26. See, e.g., TARIQ RAMADAN, WESTERN MUSLIMS AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM 94 (2005)
("[T]o apply the shari'a for Muslim citizens or residents in the West means explicitly to respect the legal
and constitutional framework of the country of which they are citizens.").
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example, they believe there is no need to have a separate "Islamic divorce" in
a shari'a council because a British civil divorce already fulfills the general
objectives of the sharia.27 Moreover, some suggest that a civil divorce even
satisfies the requirements of a more legalistic interpretation of an Islamically
valid divorce. Because the grounds for civil divorce a woman must prove in a
British court-desertion, physical or emotional abuse, adultery, etc.--echo
grounds available to a Muslim woman who petitions a qadi or shari'a council
for an Islamic divorce, these Muslims argue that a shari'a council divorce is
redundant.
28
Another reason why some British Muslim scholars are wary of shari'a
councils is because many councils follow interpretations of Islamic law they
believe are unfair towards women.2 9 These shari'a councils give women fewer
rights than Islamic family law courts in several Muslim-majority countries.
For example, while a Muslim woman in Pakistan or Egypt can automatically
receive a divorce after she repays her mahr to her husband, some shari'a
councils force women to go through an approximately one-year process to
obtain a divorce certificate. Furthermore, some councils do not accept a
Muslim woman's petition to divorce on grounds of dharar (harm) or niza 'a
wa shiqauq (discord and strife), and will require her to give up her mahr in
exchange for a divorce. 30 Some scholars even argue that many of the family
laws used by shari'a councils should no longer be valid in twenty-first century
Britain. They contend that women hold different positions in society today
than when those laws were created, and Muslim scholars need to reinterpret
the sources of Islam while keeping the maqasid in mind.3 1
IV. Conclusion
As the British Muslim scholars' diverse viewpoints regarding legal
recognition of Islamic family law demonstrate, monolithic fears that
implementing the shari'a in the United Kingdom will automatically lead to
repressive, antiwomen practices are unfounded. However, for this very reason,
the British Parliament should be wary of establishing a system in which
Islamic family law is legally enforceable by the state. If the British
government recognizes only certain interpretations of Islamic family law-
either those of specific shari'a councils or of a codified list to be enforced by
British judges-it will confer authority on those interpretations, while
excluding other equally legitimate interpretations. This could exacerbate
intracommunal tensions because various shari'a councils would compete with
each other for government recognition and British Muslims would be
27. Interview with Professor, A1-Mahdi Inst., in Birmingham, Eng. (May 11, 2006) (name
withheld) (stating that a British civil divorce is Islamically valid in all circumstances because the shari'a
recognizes all local customs ('urf) if they do not contradict the maqasid).
28. CARROLL, supra note 11, at 9, 16.
29. Interview with Muslim Chaplain, a university, in London, Eng. (May 16, 2006) (stating
that the way the majority of shari'a councils implement Islamic law puts "everything in the man's
favor") (name and affiliation withheld).
30. SOHAIL AKBAR WARRAICH & CASSANDRA BALCHIN, RECOGNIZING THE UN-RECOGNIZED:
INTER-COUNTRY CASES AND MUSLIM MARRIAGES & DIVORCES IN BRITAIN 72 (2006).
31. See, e.g., RAMADAN, supra note 26, at 140-42.
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pressured to accept the government-approved interpretations over others. 32
Therefore, to preserve the diversity of thought inherent in Islamic
jurisprudence-and to allow British Muslims to follow the interpretations
most suitable for their daily lives-the British government should not legally
recognize Islamic family law.
32. These intra-communal tensions are prevalent among Muslims in India, which legally
recognizes Islamic family law. For example, many Muslims have criticized the All India Muslim
Personal Law Board, a private organization established to preserve Islamic family law in India, of
"consolidating its position as the only arbiter of Muslim destiny in secular, republican India." Ayub
Khan, The Fear of Shariah, MILLl GAZETTE, July 1, 2005, available at http://www.milligazette.com/
Archives/2005/01- 15July05-Print-Edition/01 1507200506.htm.
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Succession Law in the Persian Gulf. By Scott R. Anderson
I. Introduction
The powerful generation of rulers that brought the Arab monarchies of
the Persian Gulf into the oil age is gradually passing away.' In their wake,
elites are being forced to revisit the divisive question of royal succession, and
when and how power will pass to a new generation. Given the region's
delicate global economic and political position, skeptics have reasonably
begun to question whether the ambiguous traditions that have governed
succession in the past remain up to the task. This Recent Development
surveys how three of these countries-the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia-have dealt with the challenge of modem
succession. In each, the royal family's discretion in selecting an heir appears
to have been constrained by other actors on the basis of new or newly
interpreted constitutional powers-a trend that may provide a window into the
future of constitutionalism in the Gulf region.
II. Historical Background
The sovereign largely remains the center of political authority in the
Arab monarchies. While all of the Gulf countries have adopted constitutions
(often called Basic Laws) that legally frame the rights and responsibilities of
government, they do little to curb royal prerogative. Recently implemented
consultative councils and quasi-legislatures provide a degree of public input
but rarely have much independent authority. By appointing members of their
family throughout government, Gulf monarchs have instead been able to keep
numerous facets of the state in the control of relatives with a vested interest in
the survival of their regime. When paired with more typical patronage
networks and fortified through oil wealth, this has generally allowed them to
retain stable, centralized control.
3
Succession poses a natural challenge to these regimes. The region's
history and traditions provide no clear rules on to whom authority should pass
after a monarch dies. Pre-twentieth-century tribal leaders often let their
surviving relatives select an heir, while more contemporary monarchs have
selected their own. Many families embrace patrilineal seniority, passing the
throne from brother to eldest brother, while others use primogeniture,
transitioning from father to eldest son. The monarch typically exercises a great
deal of discretion, oscillating between patterns and skipping over undesirable
candidates to suit their political needs.4 To ensure that their preferences are
followed, they often appoint their heirs to high positions in the cabinet,
military, or governorates to build an independent base of support. The
monarchs also compensate potential competitors with less influential
1. The portion of the Arabian Peninsula bordering the Persian Gulf contains twelve
traditional monarchies. These are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the seven
individual monarchies that compose the United Arab Emirates.
2. See NATHAN BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD 54-61 (2002).
3. For a theoretical account of this strategy of "dynastic monarchy," see MICHAEL HERB, ALL
IN THE FAMILY (1999).
4. See J.E. Peterson, Succession in the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 24 WASH. Q.
173, 177-79 (2001).
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appointments, increased subsidies, and favored marriages to encourage their
continued loyalty and cooperation.
5
That said, some heirs and new monarchs are inevitably inept, unpopular,
or face challengers intent on making their own claims to the throne.
Historically, such conditions often led to dispute, revolt, or assassination. To
avoid these outcomes, royal families have adopted a mediating role,
collectively shifting their support and control over the state bureaucracy
behind the candidate who makes the most persuasive case, after informally
debating the matter internally and reaching some rough consensus. This
strategy has deterred many challengers and resulted in fewer, mostly bloodless
coups in recent years. But it has also established the royal family as a
counterweight to the monarch's authority, requiring him to maintain a
consensus within the family on his rule and policies or else risk usurpation.
6
Despite its apparent success, doubts remain whether this opaque system
of royal consensus can stay stable into the future. Generational divides,
exponential growth, and schisms within many royal families have complicated
meaningful coordination and produced numerous potential heirs. Meanwhile,
the Gulf countries' need to economically diversify beyond the oil industry
requires regulatory and spending adjustments that will no doubt prove
unpopular among royals accustomed to high privilege. Both trends pose
challenges for regional political stability and invite questions as to whether
regional succession practices are in need of revision.
7
III. Recent Developments in Succession Law
The Gulf region's constitutions generally endorse the monarch's
traditional right to choose an heir in consultation with the royal family, and
what few checks on this power they establish have historically been marginal.8
But as the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have faced succession crises in
recent years, this trend has changed. As described below, innovative political
actors have used nuances of their constitutional systems to legitimate new
claims of authority. This has in turn allowed them to hold royal families more
accountable, and have a greater bearing on succession outcomes.
A. The United Arab Emirates
The UAE faced its first major succession crisis in November 2004, with
the death of the Emir (or King) of Abu Dhabi Zayed al-Nahyan. 9 Having been
the primary force behind the UAE's formation in 1971, Zayed was also the
one and only President of the UAE's Supreme Council of Rulers, a governing
body consisting of the monarchs of each of the UAE's seven constituent
kingdoms, or emirates. As the most powerful emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai
generally receive the positions of President and Vice President on the
5. See James Onley & Sulayman Khalaf, Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf. An
Historical-Anthropological Study, 17 HIST. & ANTHROPOLOGY 189, 193-94 (2006).
6. See HERB, supra note 3, at 21-5 1.
7. See Peterson, supra note 4, at 182-86.
8. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 64.
9. Though rumors of Shaikh Zayed's death began as early as October, public recognition did
not come until November 2, 2004. See Christopher M. Davidson, After Shaikh Zayed: The Politics of
Succession in Abu Dhabi and the UAE, 13 MIDDLE EAST POL'Y 42, 45-46 (2006).
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Supreme Council, and possess a veto over Council decisions. But the rules of
succession that determine who sits on the Council remain predominantly local
and are decided within each emirate.'
0
Abu Dhabi's hegemony over the country's armed forces and oil wealth
have allowed it to play a decisive role in smaller emirates' succession
disputes, as in 2003 when it helped stabilize the small emirate of Ras al-
Khaimah following a minor succession-related uprising."' But Zayed's death
had no such easy solution. Though the King's eldest son Khalifa was Crown
Prince, many observers expected his popular younger brother Muhammad,
commander-in-chief of the national military, to challenge his claim. Some saw
Zayed's recent elevation of Muhammad to the new position of Deputy Crown
Prince as an effective endorsement, and favored Muhammad as a stronger
bulwark against Dubai's growing influence.12
Despite these fears, Khalifa ascended to the throne. His position was
fortified almost immediately by the Supreme Council of Rulers, which
unanimously elected him the new President. The Council's swift action
departed somewhat from their constitutional role, which allowed for up to a
month-long waiting period before a new President was elected,13 apparently to
allow succession disputes to be resolved locally. Instead, the Council's move
secured Khalifa's ascension and effectively deterred further debate on the
matter within Abu Dhabi's royal family. No subsequent challenge emerged
from Muhammad, who accepted a position as the new Crown Prince.1
4
This pattern repeated itself in January 2006, when the Emir of Dubai
died and his newly ascended successor was quickly elected Vice President.'
5
Seemingly bolstered by the Council's check on familial resistance, the new
Emir shifted succession from his brother to his son in February 2008,16 a sign
of autonomy that Khalifa may yet imitate. In both cases, the Council's support
seems likely to serve as a bulwark for both rulers against efforts to effect
change from within their respective families.
B. Kuwait
Kuwait faced an even more difficult transition upon the death of its
Emir, Jaber al-Sabah, in January 2006. Jaber's elderly heir, Sa'ad al-Sabah,
was nearly incapacitated by illness and widely seen as unfit to rule. But the
royal family seemed unable to settle on an alternative. Family tradition held
10. See CHRISTOPHER DAVIDSON, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A STUDY IN SURVIVAL 188-
97 (2005).
11. See SIMON HENDERSON, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, SUCCESSION POLITICS IN THE
CONSERVATIVE ARAB GULF STATES: THE WEEKEND'S EVENTS IN RAS AL-KHAIMAH (2003),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID = 1647.
12. See Davidson, supra note 9, at 46-49.
13. U.A.E. CONST. art. 53 (1996), available at http'//www.majles-uae.com/english/
uploads/CNSTIT E.pdf.
14. For an account of these events, see Davidson, supra note 9, at 45-46.
15. See Dubai Ruler to Form New Cabinet, PENINSULA (Qatar), Jan. 7, 2006,
http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.conDisplay news.asp?section=WorldNews&month=January2006&file
=World News200601073946.xml.
16. Shaikh Hamdan Appointed Dubai's Crown Prince, GULFNEWS.COM, Feb. 1, 2008,
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articies/08/02/01/10186492.html.
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that the throne should alternate between the rival Jaber and Salem branches of
the family, but next in line after Sa'ad was the Prime Minister Sabah aI-Sabah,
who was of the same Jaber branch as the deceased Emir. Indecision prevailed,
leaving the throne unoccupied for over ten days. 17
Kuwait's partially elected National Assembly, established by the
country's 1962 Constitution, had a limited official role in this quagmire. Its
constitutional powers regarding succession were relatively minor: receiving an
oath of investiture from any new Emir, and vetting their choice of heir.'
8
Despite these limitations, stalemate within the family pushed the Assembly
towards action. Seizing upon rumors that Sa'ad was physically incapable of
taking the oath of investiture, Assembly members associated with the
deceased King's cabinet began debate on a motion finding Sa'ad unable to
meet the requirements of office, and endorsing Sabah as successor. Neither of
these acts were clearly within the Assembly's constitutional authority, as
Sa'ad's inability to recite the oath did not clearly disqualify him, let alone give
the Assembly the right to nominate an heir without input from the royal
family. Yet the threat alone was sufficient to provoke action: before the
motion could be voted upon, a letter was received from Sa'ad officially
abdicating in favor of Sabah.' 9
The National Assembly's actions demonstrated its limited appetite for
political uncertainty, and will likely discourage the al-Sabah family from
permitting such uncertainty in the future. Furthermore, its maneuver appears
to have bolstered Sabah, giving him a fortified position that was quickly
demonstrated by his appointment of his half-brother Nawwaf, also of the Jaber
branch, as heir, in violation of family protocol. The Assembly's approval of
this choice further reinforces Sabah's autonomy from broader family
preferences.2 °
C. Saudi Arabia
In part to avoid internal competition, the throne of Saudi Arabia has
passed horizontally between the sons of the nation's founder, Ibn Saud, since
his death in 1953. Consequently, the current King Abdallah inherited the
throne in August 2005 at the estimated age of eighty-two, while his Crown
Prince Sultan, already selected as part of a family power-sharing arrangement,
was eighty-one. The similarly advanced ages of siblings next in succession
made it difficult to ignore the country's brewing generational crisis." But
calls for Abdallah to appoint someone of the next generation as the Sultan's
successor faced two difficulties: first, selecting an heir from Ibn Saud's
dozens of eligible grandsons; and second, overcoming opposition from
17. SIMON HENDERSON, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL'Y, KUWAIT'S PARLIAMENT
DECIDES WHO RULES (2006), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2437.
18. KUWAIT CONST. arts. 4, 60 (1962), available at http://www.kuwait-info.com/
sidepages/cont.asp.
19. See Henderson, supra note 17.
20. For an account of these events, see SIMON HENDERSON, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST
POL'Y, KUWAIT'S ELECTIONS EXACERBATE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RULER AND PARLIAMENT (2006),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2483.
21. See Steve Coil, Rivalries May Yet Emerge in a Complex Succession, WASH. POST, Aug. 2,
2005, at A9.
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Abdallah's surviving brothers, many of whom were not ready to abandon their
claims to the throne. As a result, the future of succession remained unclear
until October 2006.22
That month, King Abdallah issued a radical new edict dubbed the
Allegiance Institution Law, and incorporated it into the country's Basic Law.
The Institution itself was formed a year later, with the issuance of governing
bylaws and appointment of thirty-five initial members.23 It consists of each of
the surviving sons of Ibn Saud, or one of their male descendents if the
24individual is dead or unable to participate. This body has the ability to vet
the King's nominees for heir, and even submit and eventually select its own
nominee if the King's are deemed unsuitable.25 In addition, if both the King
and Crown Prince are found to be incapable of keeping the throne, the
Institution may establish an emergency transitional government and even elect
a new king from Ibn Saud's descendants. 26 And to ensure that the Institution's
decisions are not disputed, detailed minutes of its secret meetings are kept and
stored for future reference.
27
This landmark reform embeds succession processes in a formal political
institution and provides the documentation necessary for disputes to be
resolved quickly and legally. The natural generational shift in the body's
representation over time seems to make intergenerational transfers of power
not only possible but inevitable, and emergency provisions seem well suited to
ensure political stability even in times of crisis. 28 Similarly, future monarchs
are likely to benefit from clearer standards of when they risk losing power,
limiting their reliance on a broad family consensus. The primary loser in this
arrangement is the broader royal family, whose voice on succession is limited
to that expressed through relatives on the Institution, and consequently is
likely to carry less weight.
IV. Analysis
Royal families in each of the above countries have seen their discretion
over succession affected by either the innovative actions of existing political
institutions or the creation of new ones. Law seems to have been significant in
each case, giving political actors a textual basis from which to draw
legitimacy for their actions, or in which to embed their innovations. While by
no means liberal or democratic, this constitutional activity nonetheless reflects
the ability of actors to reinterpret and draw authority from the law, allowing
22. See AWADH AL-BADI, ARAB REFORM BRIEF, INSTITUTIONALIZING HEREDITARY
SUCCESSION IN SAUDI ARABIA'S POLITICAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM: THE ALLEGIANCE COMMISSION 1-3
(2008).
23. Id.; see The Allegiance Institution Law (Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Allegiance Institution
Law], available at http://www.saudiembassy.net/2006News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?clndex=651;
Bylaws to the Allegiance Institution Law (Oct. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Allegiance Institution Bylaws],
available at http://www.saudiembassy.net/2007News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?clndex=702.
24. Allegiance Institution Law, supra note 23, art. 1; Allegiance Institution Bylaws, supra
note 23, art. 1.
25. Allegiance Institution Law, supra note 23, arts. 7-9.
26. Id. arts. 10, 12-13.
27. Id. arts. 21-23; Allegiance Institution Bylaws, supra note 23, art. 13.
28. See al-Badi, supra note 22, at 7-8.
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them to hold other powerful actors, if not the monarch himself, accountable to
some degree.
29
Determining why this trend has emerged is more difficult. Some actors
may have been concerned by the shadow that potential political instability
casts over their privileged position in society. Others may have worried that
chaotic successions would hinder business activities and economic
development through unfavorable foreign investor reactions and credit
ratings. 30 Embedding succession in a more politically accountable or
institutionalized process may be seen as limiting its unpredictability,
promoting policy continuity, and reducing outside perceptions of political
risk. Similarly, clearer procedures for securing succession and maintaining
legitimate authority may reduce a current monarch's reliance upon broad
familial consensus, providing him an incentive in the form of greater
autonomy in exercising his political authority.
31
The immediate relevance of this trend to the other Gulf states is difficult
to discern. Bahrain's constitution limits the space available for succession
disputes by embracing primogeniture and establishing the eldest son as a
default heir unless overruled by the King. 32 Qatar's Basic Law similarly
embraces primogeniture but has no default rule, 33 leaving greater ambiguity
that could prove problematic given its history of usurpation 34 and recent
succession controversies. 35 Oman's situation is the most ambiguous, as the
current Sultan Qaboos has no living brothers, children, or proclaimed heirs.
The Omani Basic Law currently gives his family three days to select a
successor upon his death. If they fail to agree, then the country's military
leaders are supposed to enforce a secret order of succession issued by Qaboos
36before his death, a possibility that leaves significant room for dispute,
conflict, and a possible military oligarchy.37
Even if the trend described above continues, wealth, status, and positions
in the bureaucracy will provide royal families with significant power in the
Gulf monarchies for years to come. Some may accept their marginalization as
a necessary sacrifice to retain their overall privileged status. But others may
resist, upsetting the familial consensuses that have helped preserve regional
stability for decades. Whatever comes to pass, these future developments
should speak volumes on the Gulf's future interactions with the world, and the
29. For one account of this "Arab constitutionalism," see BROWN, supra note 2, at 197-200.
30. See, e.g., Moody's Upgrades Five Gulf Countries, AL-BAWABA, July 25, 2007 ("The
strength of domestic institutions in the [Gulf] tends to lag that of highly rated countries in other regions
and there are questions regarding the path of political succession within the ruling families .
31. See Peterson, supra note 4, at 184-85.
32. BAHR. CONST. art. I, available at http://servat.unibe.ch/iclba00000 -html.
33. QATAR CONST. art. 8, available at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/
qatar/constitution2003.htm.
34. See Jill Crystal, Eastern Arabian States, in THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 153, 174-75 (David E. Long et al. eds., 5th ed. 2007).
35. See New Qatar Crown Prince Named, BBC NEWS, Aug. 5, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle east/3124575.stm.
36. THE WHITE BOOK: THE BASIC LAW OF THE SULTANATE OF OMAN [Constitution] arts. 5-6,
available at http://www.omanet.om/english/govemment/basiclaw/overview.asp.
37. See Mark N. Katz, Assessing the Political Stability of Oman, MIDDLE EAST REV. INT'L.
AFF., Sept. 2004, at 1, 4-6.
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degree to which law can still carry some weight in even the most autocratic
states.
Recent Developments
Due Process and Sanctions Targeted Against Individuals Pursuant to
U.N. Resolution 1267 (1999). By Johannes Reich*
I. Piercing the Veil of Statehood
Sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council have served
as an essential instrument to influence and alter the behavior of national
leaders in order to maintain international peace and security. Since the first
mandatory nonmilitary sanctions regime was established in December 1966
against the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia, the targets of
these coercive means have traditionally been states or their representatives. In
contrast, the legal framework established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999)
and subsequent decisions by the Security Council represents a move to pierce
the veil of statehood. Under this new regime, individuals not necessarily
associated with states or state actors are subject to sanctions. This shift in
focus raises pressing issues of constitutional law, not least because the current
system lacks basic guarantees of fair trial and effective remedy. Nevertheless,
this framework built upon the U.N. Charter is, despite its deficiencies, the
only one capable of coping with challenges such as international terrorism
which exceed the reach of the nation-state. This Recent Development explores
the question: what strategy would both strengthen the rule of law within the
U.N. sanctions regime and preserve the international mechanism addressing
the most pressing collective challenges to peace?
II. The Emergence of a Barely Checked Supranational
Administrative Agency
The "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security" is vested in the Security Council. 1 That body enjoys wide, if not
unlimited, discretion to determine whether a certain event amounts to a "threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." 2 Such a determination
allows the Security Council to "make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and
security." 3 The Security Council is specifically entitled to "decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed.",
4
However, all such decisions made under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
"shall be carried out by the Members of the U.N. directly and through their
action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members."
5
Consequently, the resolutions of the Security Council, including sanctions, are
not self-executing. They require a national enforcement mechanism. In the
United States, U.N. sanctions are usually enforced through Executive Orders.
* I would like to thank Professor W. Michael Reisman, Michael Thad Allen, and Jedidiah J.
Kroncke for their criticisms and comments on earlier versions of this piece as well as the responsible
editors, Peter Harrell, Jonathan Finer, and Vivek Krishnamurthy, for their most valuable support and
suggestions.
1. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
2. U.N. Charter art. 39.
3. Id.
4. U.N. Charter art. 41.
5. U.N. Charter art. 48, para. 2.
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On October 15, 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1267
(1999) acting under Chapter VII. 6 In order "that the Taliban turn over Usama
bin Laden" it imposed an air embargo on the Taliban and froze "funds and
other financial resources" owned or controlled by the Taliban. The scope of
these sanctions was considerably expanded by Resolution 1333 (2000),
adopted on December 19, 2000, to include "Usama bin Laden and individuals
and entities associated with him . . . including those in the Al-Qaida
organization." 7 The Security Council decided that the member states shall
freeze financial assets of these individuals (asset freeze), prevent them from
entering or traveling through their territory (travel ban), and impose an arms
embargo on the designated individuals and entities.8 The administration of
these sanctions was delegated to a special committee of the Security Council
comprised of representatives of all Security Council members.
9
This Committee registers individuals and entities associated with Osama
bin Laden or the Qaeda organization in "an updated list, based on information
provided by States and regional organizations." 10 This so-called
"Consolidated List" catalogues the subjects against whom the sanctions to be
enforced by the member-states apply. Each member of the United Nations is
entitled to propose individuals or entities to be included on the Consolidated
List." The sanctions imposed as a result of the listing constitute a mere
"preventive measure in combating terrorist activity.,' 2 They "are not reliant
upon criminal standards set out under national law."' 3 Consequently, neither a
criminal charge nor a conviction is a precondition to be proposed or listed.'
4
The Committee makes its decisions whether or not to include a person or
entity in the Consolidated List unanimously. Each member-state of the
Committee therefore has a veto; issues on which the Committee fails to reach
a consensus are submitted to the Security Council.15
The current framework provides for two different procedures for an
individual or an entity to seek to be de-listed directly (the so-called "focal
point process") and for a state of residence or citizenship to request removal.16
The "focal point process" allows affected individuals or entities to access the
United Nations directly through its "focal point," an agency within the U.N.
Secretariat designed to receive de-listing requests. 17 The focal point, however,
6. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
7. S.C. Res. 1333, 1 8(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000).
8. S.C. Res. 1390, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002).
9. S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 6, 6; see Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to
Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities,
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/ 1267 (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
10. S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 8, 2(c) (emphasis added). See also S.C. Res. 1333, supra note
7, 8(c).
11. S.C. Res. 1735,15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006).
12. S.C. Res. 1617, pmbl. & 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005) (emphasis added).
13. S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 11, pmbl. (emphasis added).
14. Sec. Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267, Guidelines of the
Committee for the Conduct of its Work, 6(c) (Feb. 12, 2007), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/
1267/1267 guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines].
15. Id. 4(a).
16. See S.C. Res. 1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006).
17. See id. 2 & annex.
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engages neither in factfinding nor in applying laws.' 8 It merely informs the
government that initially requested the listing and the government of
citizenship and residence of the individual or entity's request for de-listing.' 9
At least one of these states is required to endorse such a request in order for it
to be placed on the Committee's agenda. 20 The request is deemed to be
rejected if, after a limited period of consultation, none of the members of the
Committee explicitly ask for the de-listing. Since decisions are made
unanimously, the petition is also dismissed if one or more of the fifteen
members opposes the request.21 Moreover, the state of residence or citizenship
is entitled to request that a person or entity be removed from the Consolidated
List.
22
This mechanism, which installs the Committee as a supranational
agency administering sanctions imposed on individuals, is problematic on
several grounds. The procedure outlined above might be apt to cope with
measures intended to be "preventive in nature,",2 3 but it fails to provide
appropriate legal standards for measures which practically amount to criminal
sanctions. For example, in the case Nada v. SECO, discussed below, the
Security Council has frozen assets of and imposed a travel ban on an
individual for more than six years. Moreover, none of the resolutions adopted
to date provide a clear legal standard as to whether or not an individual or
entity is entitled to be removed from the Consolidated List. The current
framework only provides factors which the Committee may or may not take
24into consideration. Consequently, even a mistake in identity or the death of a
listed subject would not necessarily result in a de-listing. Moreover, the state
that initially requests a listing acts as an iudex in causa sua reviewing its own
decision. Finally, the consensual decisionmaking process is strongly biased
toward preserving the status quo. The mechanism accepts that a person or
entity may remain on the Consolidated List for years based on mere hearsay
or intelligence that the listed person had no opportunity to challenge.
III. Blacklisted: Nada v. State Secretariat for Economic Affairs2 s
A case recently decided by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court highlights
the legal problems associated with this sanctions regime. Youssef Mustapha
Nada, an Italian national born in Egypt, has been a resident of Campione
d'Italia, a small Italian enclave roughly half a square mile in size fully
surrounded by Swiss territory. Mr. Nada, a member of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, was a cofounder and co-owner of Al Taqwa Management SA
(later renamed "Nada Management Organization"), a financial network with
subsidiaries and branches in Europe, the Maghreb, and the Caribbean. In a
radio address on November 12, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush referred




22. See Guidelines, supra note 14, 8(e).
23. Id. 6(c).
24. S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 11, 14 (emphasis added).
25. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] Nov. 14, 2007, 133 Entscheidungen des
Schweizerischen Bundesgenchts [BGE] 11 450 (Switz.).
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to the institution as one "of two terrorist supporting financial networks." 26 Mr.
Nada was thus named a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" by the U.S.
Treasury.27 Consequently, at the request of the United States, on November 9,
2001, Nada appeared as "QI.E.53.01" on the U.N Security Council's so-called
"blacklist," the Consolidated List of the U.N. Security Council.
In order to enforce the Security Council's non-self-executing sanction,
the Swiss Federal Council (Switzerland's executive branch) added Mr. Nada's
name to the appendix of a decree three weeks later.28 As a consequence, Mr.
Nada was barred from leaving the enclave of Campione d'Italia, and his assets
were frozen. An investigation launched by the Office of the Attorney General
of Switzerland was closed after more than three years, finding insufficient
evidence to bring the case to the Swiss Federal Criminal Court. 9 Thereafter,
Mr. Nada filed a petition with the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
(SECO), the administrative agency responsible for the domestic enforcement
of the sanctions, asking that the constraints be lifted. SECO, however,
dismissed the petition, arguing that Switzerland was bound by the resolutions
of the Security Council made pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and
that SECO was not allowed to review such decisions. On administrative
appeal, the Federal Department of Economic Affairs reached the same
conclusion.
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court dismissed Mr. Nada's petition on
November 14, 2007, holding that Switzerland was, according to the U.N.
Charter, obliged to enforce decisions of the Security Council. The Court
further stated that member-states could only annul resolutions made by the
Security Council when they would conflict with jus cogens norms. As the
guarantees invoked by the petitioner would not qualify as such peremptory
norms of international law, the court refused to indirectly review the Security
Council's resolutions by annulling the federal decree.
Despite their apparent tension with fundamental human rights (such as
the guarantee of a fair trial) these judicial decisions are far from unique. Nada
v. SECO might dramatically illustrate the legal concerns associated with the
current regime as the geographical particularities of the case resulted in a
situation that "comes close to house arrest., 30 However, the Court of the First
Instance of the European Communities also refused to review indirectly U.N.
sanctions on similar grounds. 31 Furthermore, U.S. courts have consistently
refrained from annulling economic sanctions imposed or enforced by the
26. President George W. Bush, Radio Address by the President to the Nation (Nov. 12, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110.html.
27. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED
PERSONS 204 (Mar. 19, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/tllsdn.pdf
(updated periodically).
28. See Verordnung 0ber Massnahmen gegenUber Personen und Organisationen mit
Verbindungen zu Usama bin Laden, der Gruppierung "AI-Qa'da" oder den Taliban [Taliban Ordinance]
Oct. 2, 2000, SR 946.203, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c946 203.html (Switz.).
29. Bundesstrafgericht [Federal Criminal Court], Nov. 30, 2005, BK 2005.14 (Switz.) A,
available at http://bstger.weblaw.ch/docs/BK_2005_ 13.pdf.
30. Nada, 133 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] 11 at 467.
31. See, e.g., Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R 11-
3649, available at http://curia.europa.eu/ (select "Case Law," then select "Search form," then enter "T-
315/01").
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federal government. 32 In light of the apparent deficiencies of the legal
framework established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999), this reluctance of
national courts, however, is unlikely to persist. The looming possibility of a
clash between national courts and the international regime should encourage
the member states to press for an overhaul of the current sanctions regime.
IV. Providing for Fair Trial and Effective Remedy
An effective response to the challenges posed by international terrorism,
in particular the attempt to eliminate the financial networks supporting such
activities, transcends the reach of individual nation-states. This became
apparent when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 on September
28, 2001, obliging all member-states to criminalize the funding of terrorist
acts.33 This resolution grants the Security Council wide discretion to define
both the elastic notion of a "threat to peace" 34 (which trigger measures
according to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter) 35 and the member-states'
obligation to carry out these decisions. 36 According to these unambiguous
texts, member-states are neither entitled to invoke conflicting international
obligations nor domestic law in a bid to avoid enforcing such resolutions.
37
The Security Council is, indeed, bound by "the Purposes and Principles
of the United Nations." 38 In particular it must heed "human rights., 39 The fact
that legal constraints bind the Security Council does not, however, establish
jurisdiction of international or national authorities to review whether the
Security Council does, in fact, meet its obligations. As opposed to the court-
centered legal framework of most contemporary nation-states, the U.N.
Charter established a system built around the Security Council as a political
body checked through its own decisionmaking mechanism, namely the veto
power of its permanent members.4 ° Consequently, the International Court of
Justice has refrained from reviewing the resolutions made by the Security
Council. 41 In order to hold the Security Council at bay, legal scholarship has
elaborated two distinctive concepts. Acts of the Security Council taken clearly
32. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The United States, in NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED
NATIONS SANCTIONS 618-19 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2004). See also United States v. Dhafir, 461
F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006); Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 373 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir.
2004). But see Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding Council sanctions against
Rhodesia unenforceable because of a subsequent federal statute).
33. S.C. Res. 1373, l(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1733 (Sept. 28, 2001).
34. U.N. Charter art. 39.
35. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992) (stating that Libya's
refusal to extradite the subjects suspected of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland
years after the attack amounted to a "threat to peace").
36. See U.N. Charter art. 48; see also id. art. 1, para. I.
37. U.N. Charter art. 103; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
38. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2.
39. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2.
40. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. See W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the
United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 94-96 (1993).
41. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. 16, 45 (June 21).
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outside its competence (manifestly ultra vires) are not legally binding.42
Moreover, resolutions violating norms of jus cogens are held to be void.4 3
Given the Security Council's wide discretion in determining whether and how
it should act under Chapter VII, decisions made clearly beyond its competence
almost never occur. Furthermore, the substance of jus cogens norms-that is,
a provision "accepted and recognized by the international communit, of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 4 -is
narrow and contrasts with the broad powers of the Security Council. In sum,
neither of these concepts could effectively check the Security Council.
Whereas the inherent checks imposed on the Security Council through
its process of decisionmaking might, in general, have prevented the Council
from losing sight of the principles and purposes of the U.N. as far as state and
state elites were concerned, these checks are far less effective in cases
involving targeted individuals. This lack of effective constraint invites
national and regional international courts to provide basic guarantees. The
European Court of Human Rights, in particular, stated in a precedent issued in
2005 that it would only defer to national acts enforcing the Security Council's
resolution as long as the mechanism controlling the observance of
fundamental rights can be considered "at least equivalent" to that provided by
the guarantees enshrined in the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.45 Apart from the fact that such an
approach is hardly consistent with the "supremacy clause" of the U.N
46Charter, such a development risks seriously undermining the U.N.'s already
fragile ability "to take effective collective measures" 47 in the face of
challenges which exceed states' legal and economic resources. Judicial review
of Security Council resolutions by national courts would open Pandora's box
and result in the fragmentation of U.N. resolutions along the borders of
national and supranational jurisdictions." Hence, the U.N. itself must provide
for an independent administrative mechanism to review both the listing and
de-listing decisions made by the Committee. Only a mechanism at the level of
the U.N. can, at the same time, preserve the crucial framework of international
implementation of collective measures and also validate the core principles of
the rule of law. Such a review mechanism should build upon the principles set
forth by the Security Council in Resolution 1617, which imposes sanctions as
42. See, e.g., Jochen Frowein, The UN Anti-Terrorism Administration and the Rule of Law, in
COMMON VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT 785, 790
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds, 2006).
43. See, e.g., Karl Doehring, Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and their Legal
Consequences, MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 91, 102-09 (1997).
44. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 37, art. 53.
45. Bosphorus Hava Yollan Tunzm ve Ticaret Anonim $irketi v. Ireland, 2005-VII Eur. Ct.
H.R. 109, 158.
46. U.N. Charter art. 103. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 37,
art. 30 para. 1.
47. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added).
48. See Bosphorus, supra note 45, at 158. See also Opinion of Advocate Gen. Poiares Maduro
56, Case C-402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Comm'n (Jan. 16, 2008), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/ (select "Case Law," then select "Search form," then enter "C-402/05 P")
(recommending that the court reverse the earlier Kadi opinion and annul the regulation enforcing U.N.
Security Resolutions).
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a "preventive measure in combating terrorist activity., 49 Consequently, such
measures would have to be imposed for a limited duration only based upon,
inter alia, the level of complexity present in a criminal investigation. Such a
time limit would justify the listing decision being based upon prima facie
evidence not necessarily meeting the standards of criminal proceedings. The
time limit could, furthermore, provide incentives to launch formal
investigations and criminal proceedings in absentia if unavoidable. De-listing
requests should be addressed to an independent panel within the U.N.
framework consisting of independent experts.
The perseverance of the international system comes at the price of delay,
as adapting international law through the channels of international politics is
often a painstakingly slow process. In order to adjust the balance between the
long-held interest of protecting the international legal order for the sake of
individual liberty, member states should, in the meantime, make use of the
leeway granted them for humanitarian needs on a case-by-case basis. After all,
as Max Weber famously stated, "[p]olitics is a strong and slow boring of hard
boards. It takes both passion and perspective."
50
49. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 12, pmbl.
50. MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS VOCATION 55 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1965).
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